http://www.bardehle.com/ News of Bardehle Pagenberg en http://www.bardehle.com/fileadmin/img/Bardehle_Pagenberg_icon.jpg http://www.bardehle.com/ 75 75 News of Bardehle Pagenberg TYPO3 - get.content.right http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss Wed, 22 Feb 2012 12:44:00 +0100 http://www.bardehle.com/no_cache/en/news/news_of_the_firm/release/article/german-parliament-proposes-bill-no-patentability-of-farm-animals-and-agricultural-crops-in-german.html Am 17. Januar 2012 haben die Fraktionen CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP und Bündnis 90/die Grünen eine gemeinsame... Die weltweite Bedeutung der grünen Biotechnologie Die Bedeutung der globalen grünen Biotechnologie ist sehr groß. So werden 148 Mio. ha weltweit für den Anbau gentechnisch veränderter Pflanzen verwendet. Während in den USA und Asien große Mengen dieser Pflanzen hergestellt und verkauft werden, nimmt ihre Akzeptanz  in einigen Ländern Europas, insbesondere in Deutschland weiter ab. Ein Ausweg aus dieser Problematik ist das Forschen nach verbesserten nicht-gentechnisch veränderten Pflanzen. Neben der konventionellen Züchtung wird hier auf die effizientere Marker-unterstützte Züchtung gesetzt. Wie bei konventionellen Züchtungsverfahren wird nach Pflanzen mit erwünschten Eigenschaften durch Kreuzung und Selektion gesucht. Durch molekulare Marker werden die durch Kreuzung erzeugten Pflanzen schneller und genauer selektioniert. Die Marker befinden sich nach der Selektion nicht in den Pflanzen, so dass die erzeugten  Pflanzen nicht gentechnisch verändert sind.    Die aktuelle Patentpraxis Die EU-Biotechnologie-Richtlinie 98/44 hat das Ziel, den rechtlichen Schutz biotechnologischer Erfindungen zu stärken. Sie wurde 2005 in deutsches Recht umgesetzt. Die Richtlinie wurde ferner von der Europäischen Patentorganisation in das Europäische Patentübereinkommen (EPÜ) implementiert. Nach der Richtlinie und dem angepassten deutschen und europäischen Patentrecht können Erfindungen auf Tiere und Pflanzen patentiert werden, sofern die technische Lehre der Erfindung nicht auf eine bestimmte Tierrasse oder Pflanzensorte beschränkt ist, die von der Patentierbarkeit explizit ausgenommen sind. Die Begründung für den Ausschluss von Pflanzensorten besteht darin, dass durch den Sortenschutz ein komplementäres Schutzrecht verfügbar ist und ein Doppelschutz nicht erforderlich ist. Für Tierrassen gibt es kein solches komplementäres Schutzrecht. Das Deutsche und das Europäische Patentamt erteilen auf der Grundlage des geltenden Rechts Patente auf Erfindungen, die Pflanzen und Tiere betreffen. Die Vorlage Ausgangspunkt der Vorlage ist die Bestimmung Art. 53b), 2. Alt. EPÜ, nach der im Wesentlichen biologische Verfahren zur Züchtung von Pflanzen oder Tiere ausgeschlossen sind. In ihren Entscheidungen vom 9. Dezember 2010 hat die Große Beschwerdekammer des EPA im „Tomaten“ bzw. „Brokkoli“-Fall entschieden, wann ein Verfahren ein im wesentlichen biologisches Verfahren darstellt, das von der Patentierbarkeit ausgeschlossen ist. Die Autoren der Vorlage argumentieren nun, dass Art. 53b) EPÜ, der nur Verfahren zur Züchtung von Pflanzen und Tieren von der Patentierbarkeit ausschließt, konsequenterweise auch Pflanzen und Tiere ausnehmen sollte, die durch solche Verfahren erhalten wurden. Das geltende Patentgesetz schützt die Pflanzenzüchter Das deutsche und europäische Patentamt erteilen Patente auf Erfindungen, die neu sind, auf einer erfinderischen Tätigkeit beruhen und gewerblich anwendbar sind. Erfindungen, die Tiere bzw. Pflanzen betreffen, werden daher erteilt, wenn diese Tiere bzw. Pflanzen nicht „naheliegend“ sind, insbesondere weil sie gegenüber vorbekannten Pflanzen und Tieren unerwartete vorteilhafte Eigenschaften aufweisen. Der Erfinder leistet daher einen Beitrag, den andere nutzen können (aber nicht nutzen müssen) und erhält dafür ein Patent, das ihm zeitlich begrenzte Ausschließlichkeitsrechte gewährt. Sofern es sich um gentechnisch veränderte Tiere oder Pflanzen handelt, wird diese Praxis von den Gegnern auch nicht in Zweifel gezogen, sondern die Vorlage betrifft allein den Fall, dass die landwirtschaftlichen Nutztiere oder Nutzpflanzen über konventionelle Züchtungsverfahren erhalten wurden. Auch wenn ein bekanntes Verfahren angewendet wird, schließt dies nicht aus, dass patentfähige Produkte erhalten werden, die neue vorteilhafte Eigenschaften aufweisen. Beispielsweise war lange bekannt, dass durch Bestrahlung die Eigenschaften von Bakterien verändert werden können. Wenn jetzt bekannte Bakterien bestrahlt werden und hierdurch ein neues Bakterium entsteht, das sich von den bekannten in nicht naheliegender Weise unterscheidet, weil es besondere vorteilhafte Eigenschaften aufweist, so ist das Bakterium patentfähig. Es ist nicht zu erkennen, warum dem Erfinder, der konventionelle Züchtungsverfahren anwendet, die „Belohnung“, d.h. die Patenterteilung versagt werden sollte. Dies gilt insbesondere wenn die Züchtung zu einem Nutztier führt, das nicht wie Nutzpflanzen durch ein anderes Schutzrecht wie den Sortenschutz geschützt werden kann. Die Gegner einer Patentierung von Pflanzen und Tieren argumentieren, dass der Ausschluss von Verfahren zur Züchtung von Tieren und Pflanzen in das Patentgesetz aufgenommen wurde, um konventionelle Tier- und Pflanzenzüchter nicht zu behindern. Dieser Zweck wird, wie nachfolgend ausgeführt, auch dann erreicht, wenn die bisherige Praxis der Patentierung beibehalten wird. Das deutsche Patentgesetz sieht vor, dass die Nutzung einer patentierten Pflanze zum Zweck der Züchtung einer neuen Pflanzensorte keine Patentverletzung darstellt (§ 11 Nr. 2a PatG). Das Patentgesetz trägt daher den Bedenken der Pflanzenzüchter bereits ausreichend Rechnung.  Anders ist die Situation bei Tierzüchtern. Die Verwendung eines patentgeschützten Nutztiers zu Zwecken der Züchtung stellt eine Patentverletzung dar. Würde man die Patentierbarkeit von Nutztieren ausschließen, wäre nicht nur die Verwendung zu Zuchtzwecken frei, sondern auch jede weitere Verwendung zu gewerblichen Zwecken, so dass derjenige, der ein neues Tier gezüchtet hat, ohne Schutzrechte dastehen würde. Jeder Anreiz für eine gewerbliche Züchtung von neuen Nutztieren würde dadurch entfallen. Das deutsche Patentgesetz schränkt den Patenschutz auf Nutztiere jedoch durch das sogenannte Landwirte-Privileg ein. Dem Patentinhaber steht das Recht auf die 1. Generation von Nutztieren und Nutzpflanzen zu. Sofern die Vermehrung dieser 1. Generation nicht zu gewerblichen Zwecken erfolgt, sondern nur zur Führung der Landwirtschaft dient, fallen nachfolgende Generationen nicht unter den Patentschutz.    Das bestehende Patentgesetz berücksichtigt daher die Interessen der Pflanzenzüchter und der Landwirte und schränkt den Patentschutz ein. Ein weitergehender Ausschluss von Nutztieren und Nutzpflanzen, die durch konventionelle Züchtungsverfahren erhalten werden, würde den wirtschaftlichen Anreiz zur Forschung nach neuen Pflanzen und Tieren beseitigen. Es sei darauf hingewiesen, dass in dem „Tomaten“-Fall (EP1211926B1) die Verfahrensansprüche gestrichen wurden, jedoch Ansprüche auf die durch das konventionelle Züchtungsverfahren erhaltenen Tomaten beibehalten wurden. Die Einsprechende hat eine nochmalige Befassung der Großen Beschwerdekammer des EPA mit dieser Sache gefordert. Es bleibt also spannend.   Dr. Thomas Friede, Patentanwalt, BARDEHLE PAGENBERG, München ]]> Gewerbliche Rechtschutz Infos Wed, 22 Feb 2012 12:32:00 +0100 http://www.bardehle.com/no_cache/en/news/news_of_the_firm/release/article/dusseldorf-district-court-grants-protection-against-imitation-of-a-rear-light-for-trucks.html In a decision which has just become final, the Dusseldorf Appeal Court granted protection against... BARDEHLE PAGENBERG (Munich): Dr. Stefan Abel (Attorney-at-Law, Partner), Pascal Böhner (Attorney-at-Law, Certified IP Lawyer) Representatives Nicolaos Dasteridis SA: Von Huebner (Munich): Dominik von Huebner (Attorney-at-Law) Dusseldorf Appeal Court (20. Civil Senate) Professor Wilhelm Berneke (Presiding Judge)]]> Kanzleinews Thu, 02 Feb 2012 17:08:00 +0100 http://www.bardehle.com/no_cache/en/news/news_of_the_firm/release/article/-4d57006473.html Mistakes in the German translation of a patent application filed in a foreign language can be... a priori in the German language, because in this case, he would expose himself to the danger of losing technical disclosure content which could be missing later, if the case may be, for delimitation vis-à-vis the prior art. On the other hand, it would not make sense to first give the possibility to the applicant to safeguard his filing date for his foreign-language application, and to then deny that filing date if the subsequently filed translation is faulty. The Federal Supreme Court does not find the minimal requirements for the translation to be higher than the foreign-language application itself. These minimal requirements are: the name of the applicant, an application for grant and – at least the appearance of – a description. The law does not require any patent claims for the granting of an application date. If the above preconditions for a translation are fulfilled, the legal fiction of the non-existent application does not apply, which means that in the concrete case the claims missing in the translation did not trigger the legal consequence of the loss of the application date. The decision is very welcome since it clarifies that mistakes in the translation of patent applications not filed in the German language are not legally detrimental. Such mistakes do not lead to loss of the application date and can be corrected at any time during the application proceedings. From an attorney’s point of view, the decision is also to be evaluated very positively. If the Federal Supreme Court had decided that mistakes in the patent applications may indeed lead to a loss of the application date, the German representative of the applicant would be exposed to substantive liability risks. He would have the choice to either file the foreign-language application of his client as it is, and to file a translation later, or to file a German translation directly. The first alternative would involve the risk that a subsequently filed faulty translation may lead to a loss of the application date. The second alternative entails the risk to lose technical disclosure content which may later be missing, as the case may be, for delimitation against the prior art.]]> Gewerbliche Rechtschutz Infos Thu, 02 Feb 2012 12:04:00 +0100 http://www.bardehle.com/no_cache/en/news/news_of_the_firm/release/article/ip-report-2011v.html The current edition of our newsletter features the latest developments in IP Law. Download IP... Download IP Report 2011/V This IP Report is also available in an online version. Click here.]]> Kanzleinews Home Featured News Mon, 19 Dec 2011 17:54:00 +0100 http://www.bardehle.com/no_cache/en/news/news_of_the_firm/release/article/cologne-appeal-court-bardehle-pagenberg-again-successful-in-design-infringement-proceedings-regardi.html The Swiss-based Coltène/Whaledent AG, an internationally leading developer, manufacturer and... ex parte and issued a preliminary injunction which, after first appeal of Edelweiss, was confirmed by judgment of June 29, 2011 (Case No. 84 O 69/11). The Cologne Appeal Court recently followed the assessment of the lower instance and also found validity and infringement of the Community designs (decision of November 25, 2011 – Case No. 6 U 155/11). The Cologne Appeal Court held that it was not decisive how the asserted designs had been developed, but whether the result of this process produced a different overall impression compared with another, earlier design. In the case at hand, the prior art submitted by Edelweiss, however, was not detrimental to novelty and individual character of the asserted designs; the corresponding evidence was deemed to be inappropriate. The Cologne Appeal Court also found infringement as the asserted and accused designs produced the same overall impression, while minimal differences “receded into the realm of the imperceptible”. Representatives Coltène/Whaledent AG: BARDEHLE PAGENBERG (Munich): Dr. Henning Hartwig (Attorney-at-law, partner) Representatives Edelweiss Dentistry Products GmbH: Hofstetter, Schurack & Skora (Munich): Dr. Patrick Baronikians (Attorney-at-law) Cologne Appeal Court (6th Civil Senate): Hubertus Nolte (Presiding Judge)]]> Kanzleinews Wed, 14 Dec 2011 17:12:00 +0100 http://www.bardehle.com/no_cache/en/news/news_of_the_firm/release/article/ecj-rules-on-validity-and-infringement-test-under-european-design-law-in-re-pepsico-v-ohim-1.html Court of Justice of the European Union on the validity and infringement test under European design... Court of Justice of the European Union on the validity and infringement test under European design law (decision of October 20, 2011 – Case C-281/10 P – PepsiCo v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market – Grupo Promer) On October 20, 2011, the Court of Justice of the European Union, Europe’s final authority on Community design law, rendered its long-awaited decision in PepsiCo v OHIM (Case C-281/10 P) with the central issue being the manner in which differences or similarities between conflicting designs are established under the Community Design Regulation (“CDR”). The underlying products were small metal plates, also referred to as “rappers”, playthings inserted in product packages, and the validity of the Community design was challenged to be “in conflict with”, i.e., to infringe an earlier Spanish design. The proceedings before the Court of Justice focused on four legal questions (a fifth question related to an alleged distortion of the facts is not part of this review), namely whether the lower instance, the General Court of the European Union, committed any errors in relation to (i) the constraints on the designer’s freedom (Article 10 [2] CDR), (ii) the concept of the informed user and his level of attention (Article 10 [1] CDR), (iii) the scope of the General Court’s power of review (Article 61 [2] CDR), and (iv) whether it was possible to compare the underlying goods rather than the conflicting designs (Article 10 [1] CDR). (i) Starting with possible constraints limiting the degree of freedom of the designer in developing the design, the Court of Justice found that assessing such constraints would relate to findings of a factual nature made by the General Court rather than to any legal questions. In fact, PepsiCo did not challenge the facts as being distorted and neither disputed the relevance of the criteria for establishing the designer’s degree of freedom (inter alia, the constraints of the features imposed by the technical function of the product or an element thereof or by statutory requirements applicable to the product). Thus, the Court of Justice, in accordance with settled case law, held the challenge of that assessment as inadmissible. (ii) Turning to the concept of the informed user and his level of attention, this concept, according to the Court of Justice, first “must be understood as lying somewhere between that of the average consumer, applicable in trademark matters, who need not have any specific knowledge and who, as a rule, makes no direct comparison between the trade marks in conflict, and the sectoral expert, who is an expert with detailed technical expertise.” Consequently and second, such concept had to be understood as “referring, not to a user of average attention, but to a particularly observant one, either because of his personal experience or his extensive knowledge of the sector in question.” Thus, the very nature of the informed user would mean that, when possible, he will make a direct comparison between the designs at issue. However, it cannot be ruled out that such a comparison may be impracticable or uncommon in the sector concerned, in particular because of specific circumstances or the characteristics of the devices which the designs at issue represent. Third and finally, as regards the informed user’s level of attention, the Court of Justice held that such user, without being a designer or a technical expert, would know “the various designs which exist in the sector concerned, possesses a certain degree of knowledge with regard to the features which those designs normally include, and, as a result of his interest in the products concerned, shows a relatively high degree of attention when he uses them.” (iii) As regards the scope of the General Court’s power to review the Office’s examination of the differences and similarities between the designs at issue and its determination of whether or not there is a similar overall impression, the Court of Justice found that the in-depth examination of the designs at issue carried out by the General Court, contrary to the position also taken by the Office itself, did not go beyond its power to alter decisions under Article 61 CDR. (iv) Lastly, and related to whether the Office or the General Court are allowed to base the assessment of the designs in conflict on a comparison of physical samples of actual products rather than only on the designs as disclosed and represented in the contested and in the earlier design registration, the Court of Justice found that such comparison was not mistaken, given that the informed user was different from the ordinary average consumer. The Court added that in the present case the physical comparison was done only to confirm the judgment already reached based on the respective registrations.]]> Home Featured News Fri, 28 Oct 2011 10:58:00 +0200 http://www.bardehle.com/no_cache/en/news/news_of_the_firm/release/article/ecj-rules-on-validity-and-infringement-test-under-european-design-law-in-re-pepsico-v-ohim.html Court of Justice of the European Union on the validity and infringement test under European design... Court of Justice of the European Union on the validity and infringement test under European design law (decision of October 20, 2011 – Case C-281/10 P – PepsiCo v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market – Grupo Promer) On October 20, 2011, the Court of Justice of the European Union, Europe’s final authority on Community design law, rendered its long-awaited decision in PepsiCo v OHIM (Case C-281/10 P) with the central issue being the manner in which differences or similarities between conflicting designs are established under the Community Design Regulation (“CDR”). The underlying products were small metal plates, also referred to as “rappers”, playthings inserted in product packages, and the validity of the Community design was challenged to be “in conflict with”, i.e., to infringe an earlier Spanish design. The proceedings before the Court of Justice focused on four legal questions (a fifth question related to an alleged distortion of the facts is not part of this review), namely whether the lower instance, the General Court of the European Union, committed any errors in relation to (i) the constraints on the designer’s freedom (Article 10 [2] CDR), (ii) the concept of the informed user and his level of attention (Article 10 [1] CDR), (iii) the scope of the General Court’s power of review (Article 61 [2] CDR), and (iv) whether it was possible to compare the underlying goods rather than the conflicting designs (Article 10 [1] CDR). (i)  Starting with possible constraints limiting the degree of freedom of the designer in developing the design, the Court of Justice found that assessing such constraints would relate to findings of a factual nature made by the General Court rather than to any legal questions. In fact, PepsiCo did not challenge the facts as being distorted and neither disputed the relevance of the criteria for establishing the designer’s degree of freedom (inter alia, the constraints of the features imposed by the technical function of the product or an element thereof or by statutory requirements applicable to the product). Thus, the Court of Justice, in accordance with settled case law, held the challenge of that assessment as inadmissible. (ii)  Turning to the concept of the informed user and his level of attention, this concept, according to the Court of Justice, first “must be understood as lying somewhere between that of the average consumer, applicable in trademark matters, who need not have any specific knowledge and who, as a rule, makes no direct comparison between the trade marks in conflict, and the sectoral expert, who is an expert with detailed technical expertise.” Consequently and second, such concept had to be understood as “referring, not to a user of average attention, but to a particularly observant one, either because of his personal experience or his extensive knowledge of the sector in question.” Thus, the very nature of the informed user would mean that, when possible, he will make a direct comparison between the designs at issue. However, it cannot be ruled out that such a comparison may be impracticable or uncommon in the sector concerned, in particular because of specific circumstances or the characteristics of the devices which the designs at issue represent. Third and finally, as regards the informed user’s level of attention, the Court of Justice held that such user, without being a designer or a technical expert, would know “the various designs which exist in the sector concerned, possesses a certain degree of knowledge with regard to the features which those designs normally include, and, as a result of his interest in the products concerned, shows a relatively high degree of attention when he uses them.” (iii)  As regards the scope of the General Court’s power to review the Office’s examination of the differences and similarities between the designs at issue and its determination of whether or not there is a similar overall impression, the Court of Justice found that the in-depth examination of the designs at issue carried out by the General Court, contrary to the position also taken by the Office itself, did not go beyond its power to alter decisions under Article 61 CDR. (iv)  Lastly, and related to whether the Office or the General Court are allowed to base the assessment of the designs in conflict on a comparison of physical samples of actual products rather than only on the designs as disclosed and represented in the contested and in the earlier design registration, the Court of Justice found that such comparison was not mistaken, given that the informed user was different from the ordinary average consumer. The Court added that in the present case the physical comparison was done only to confirm the judgment already reached based on the respective registrations.]]> Thu, 27 Oct 2011 18:01:00 +0200 http://www.bardehle.com/no_cache/en/news/news_of_the_firm/release/article/ecj-exclusion-from-patentability-of-all-human-embryonic-stem-cell-related-inventions-in-europe-br.html In its ruling dated October 18, 2011 – (Case C-34/10) – the Court of Justice of the European Union... Thu, 20 Oct 2011 10:56:00 +0200 http://www.bardehle.com/no_cache/en/news/news_of_the_firm/release/article/eplaw-on-draft-agreement-for-a-unified-patent-court.html The European Patent Lawyers Association (EPLAW), under its President Dr. Jochen Pagenberg, has... The Unified Patent Court - EPLAW Resolution on the Draft Agreement 13751/11 of September 2, 2011 Introduction The European Patent Lawyers Association (EPLAW), comprising lawyers with many years of experience in European patent litigation, has been following closely the preparatory work for and the legal discussions regarding the creation of a European patent court system, more ...]]> Wed, 28 Sep 2011 11:21:00 +0200 http://www.bardehle.com/no_cache/en/news/news_of_the_firm/release/article/bardehle-pagenberg-successfully-intervenes-at-cologne-trade-fair-against-a-dozen-imitations-of-the-w.html In an action lasting several days at this year’s SPOGA Fair in Cologne, BARDEHLE PAGENBERG... BARDEHLE PAGENBERG (München): Dr. Stefan Abel (Attorney-at-Law, Partner), Pascal Böhner (Attorney-at-Law) ]]> Kanzleinews Mon, 19 Sep 2011 17:41:00 +0200